Herbrand Consistency of Some Finite Fragments of Bounded Arithmetical
  Theories by Salehi, Saeed
uΣα∂
Σα`}ı ir
Saeed Salehi Tel: +98 (0)411 339 2905
Department of Mathematics Fax: +98 (0)411 334 2102
University of Tabriz E-mail:/root@SaeedSalehi.ir/
P.O.Box 51666–17766 /SalehiPour@TabrizU.ac.ir/
Tabriz, Iran Web: http://SaeedSalehi.ir/
Herbrand Consistency of Some Finite Fragments of
Bounded Arithmetical Theories
Abstract
We formalize the notion of Herbrand Consistency in an appropriate way for bounded arithmetics,
and show the existence of a finite fragment of I∆0 whose Herbrand Consistency is not provable in
the thoery I∆0. We also show the existence of an I∆0−derivable Π1−sentence such that I∆0 cannot
prove its Herbrand Consistency.
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1 Introduction
A consequence of Go¨del’s Second Incompleteness Theorem is Π1−separation of some mathematical the-
ories; for example ZFC is not Π1−conservative over PA since ZFC ` Con(PA) but (by Go¨del’s theo-
rem) PA 6` Con(PA), where Con is the consistency predicate. Inside PA, the hierarchy {IΣn}n>0 is not
Π1−conservative, since IΣn+1 ` Con(IΣn) (but again IΣn 6` Con(IΣn)). As for the bounded arithmetics,
we only know that the elementary arithmetic I∆0 + Exp is not Π1−conservative over I∆0 +
∧
j Ωj (see
Corollary 5.34 of [5]). One candidate for Π1−separating I∆0 + Exp from I∆0 was the Cut-Free Consis-
tency of I∆0 (see [7]): it was already known that I∆0 + Exp ` CFCon(I∆0) and it was presumed that
I∆0 6` CFCon(I∆0), where CFCon stands for Cut-Free Consistency. Though this presumption took rather
a long to be established (see [14]), it opened a new line of research.
The problem of provability (or unprovability) of the cut-free consistency of weak arithmetics is an
interesting (double) generalization of Go¨del’s Second Incompleteness Theorem: the theory (being restricted
to bounded or weak arithmetics) and also the consistency predicate are both weakened. Here, we do not
intend to outline the history of this research line, and refer the reader to [11, 12]. Nevertheless, we list
some prominent results obtained so far, to put our new result in perspective.
Herbrand Consistency is denoted by HCon and (Semantic) Tableau Consistency by TabCon. Adamow-
icz (with Zbierski in 2001 [2] and) in 2002 [3] showed that I∆0 + Ωm 6` HCon(I∆0 + Ωm) for m > 2. She
had already shown the unprovability I∆0 + Ω1 6` TabCon(I∆0 + Ω1) in 1996 (but appeared in 2001 as [1]).
Salehi improved the result of [3] in [10] by showing that I∆0 + Ω1 6` HCon(I∆0 + Ω1) (see also [12]) and
the result of [2] in [9, 10] by showing S 6` HCon(S) where S is an I∆0−derivable Π2−sentence. This reslt
also implied that I∆0 6` HCon(I∆0) holds for a re-axiomatization I∆0 of I∆0. Willard [13] showed in 2002
that I∆0 6` TabCon(I∆0) and also I∆0 6` HCon(I∆0 + Ω0), where Ω0 is the axiom of the totality of the
squaring function Ω0 : ∀x∃y[y = x · x]. This was improved in [12] by showing I∆0 6` HCon(I∆0), without
using the Ω0 axiom. It was also proved in [13] that V 6` HCon(V ) for an I∆0−derivable Π1−sentence V .
Ko lodziejczyk [6] showed in 2006 that the unprovability I∆0 +
∧
j Ωj 6` HCon(I∆0 + Ω1) holds; his result
was stronger in a sense that it showed I∆0 +
∧
j Ωj 6` HCon(S + Ω1) for a finite fragment S ⊆ I∆0.
In this paper we use an idea of an anonymous referee of [12] for defining evaluations in a more effective
way (Definition 2.9) suitable for bounded arithmetics; this is a great step forward, noting our mentioning
in [12] that “[o]ur definition of Herbrand Consistency is not bet suited for I∆0”. We then partially answer
the question proposed by the anonymous referee of [11] (see Conjecture 4.1 in [11]). The author is grateful
to both the referees, for suggestions and inspirations.
We show the existence of a finite fragment T of I∆0 such that I∆0 6` HCon(T ); this generalizes the
result of [12]. We also show the existence of an I∆0−derivable Π1−sentence U such that I∆0 6` HCon(U);
this generalizes the main result of [9, 10] and [13]. For keeping the paper short, and to avoid repeating
some technical details, we apologetically invite the reader to consult [11, 12]. We also assume familiarity
with the Bible of this field [5].
2 Herbrand Consistency of Arithmetical Theories
For getting a unique Skolemized formula, it is more convenient to negation normalize and rectify it.
Definition 2.1 (Rectified Negation Normal Form) A formula is in negation normal form when no
implication symbol → appears in it, and the negation symbol ¬ appears behind the atomic formulas only.
A formula is rectified when different quantifiers refer to different variables and no variable appears both
free and bound in the formula. ♦
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Any formula can be uniquely negation normalized by removing the implication connectives (replacing
formulas of the form A → B with ¬A ∨ B) and then pushing the negations inside the sub-formulas by
de Morgan’s Law, until they get to the atomic formulas. Renaming the variables can rectify any formula.
Thus one can negation normalize and rectify a formula uniquely, up to a variable renaming.
Definition 2.2 (Skolemization) For any existential formula ∃xA(x) with m(> 0) free variables, let
f∃xA(x) be a new m−ary function symbol (which does not occur in A; cf. [4]). For any rectified negation
normal formula ϕ we define ϕS inductively:
• ϕS = ϕ for atomic or negated-atomic formula ϕ
• (ϕ ∧ ψ)S = ϕS ∧ ψS
• (ϕ ∨ ψ)S = ϕS ∨ ψS
• (∀xϕ)S = ∀xϕS
• (∃xϕ)S = ϕS[f∃xϕ(x)(y)/x] where y are the free variables of ∃xϕ(x).
Finally, the Skolemized form ϕSk of the formula ϕ is obtained by removing all the (universal) quantifiers of
ϕS. The resulted formula is an open (quantifier-less) formula, with probably some free variables. If those
(free) variables are substituted with some ground (variable-free) terms, we obtain an Skolem instance of
that formula. ♦
Summing up, to get an Skolem instance of a given formula ϕ we first negation normalize and then rectify
it to get a formula ϕRNNF; then we remove the quantifiers of (ϕRNNF)S to get (ϕRNNF)Sk, and substituting
its free variables with some ground terms, gives us an Skolem instance of the formula ϕ. Let us note that
the Skolem instances of a formula are determined uniquely.
Theorem 2.3 (Herbrand-Skolem-Go¨del) Any theory T is equi-consistent with its Skolemized theory.
In other words, the theory T is consistent if and only if every finite set of Skolem instances of T is
(propositionally) satisfiable. q
Example 2.4 In the language of arithmetic LA = {0, S,+, ·,6}, let Ind be the instance of induction
principle ψ(0) ∧ ∀x[ψ(x)→ ψ(S(x))]→ ∀xψ(x) for ψ(x) = ∃y[y 6 x · x ∧ y = x · x]. This is an axiom of
the theory I∆0. Rectified Negation Normal Form (Ind)
RNNF of Ind is
∀u[u 6 0 · 0 ∨ u 6= 0 · 0] ∨ ∃w[∃z[z 6 w · w ∧ z = w · w] ∧ ∀v[v 6 S(w) · S(w) ∨ v 6= S(w) · S(w)]] ∨
∀x∃y[y 6 x · x ∧ y = x · x].
If c is the Skolem constant symbol for ∃w[∃z[z 6 w ·w∧ z = w ·w]∧∀v[v 6 S(w) ·S(w)∨v 6= S(w) ·S(w)]],
and q(x) is the Skolem function symbol for the formula ∃z[z 6 x · x ∧ z = x · x], then ((Ind)RNNF)S is
∀u[u 6 0 · 0 ∨ u 6= 0 · 0] ∨ [[q(c) 6 c · c ∧ q(c) = c · c] ∧ ∀v[v 6 S(c) · S(c) ∨ v 6= S(c) · S(c)]] ∨
∀x[q(x) 6 x · x ∧ q(x) = x · x].
Finally, the Skolemized form (Ind)
Sk of ϕ is obtained as:
[u 6 0 · 0 ∨ u 6= 0 · 0] ∨ [[q(c) 6 c · c ∧ q(c) = c · c] ∧ [v 6 S(c) · S(c) ∨ v 6= S(c) · S(c)]] ∨
[q(x) 6 x · x ∧ q(x) = x · x].
Substituting u/0, v/S(c) · S(c), x/t will result in the following Skolem instance of ϕ:
[0 6 0 · 0 ∨ 0 6= 0 · 0] ∨ [[q(c) 6 c · c ∧ q(c) = c · c] ∧ [S(c) · S(c) 6 S(c) · S(c) ∨ S(c) · S(c) 6= S(c) · S(c)]] ∨
[q(t) 6 t · t ∧ q(t) = t · t]. ♦
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Propositional satisfiability is usually arithmetized from the usual provability, only in propositional logic
(see e.g. [5]); but in a series of more recent papers, this notion have been arithmetized differently, according
to ones needs ([1, 2, 3, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13]). We formalize the notion of propositional satisfiability by
means of evaluations (as in the op. cit. papers) on sets of (Skolem) ground terms, but in a more effective
way. To get a small evaluation on a given set of terms, we first sort its members, and then require the
equality relation to be a congruence.
We will call the ground terms constructed from Skolem function (and constant) symbols, simply terms.
For a set A, its cardinality will be denoted by |A|, and for a sequence s, its length will be also denoted by
|s|. The (i+ 1)th member of s is denoted by (s)i for any i < |s|; so s = 〈(s)0, (s)1, . . . (s)|s|−1〉. Let ≈ and
≺ be two new symbols, not in the language of arithmetic LA = 〈0, S,+, ·,6〉.
Definition 2.5 (Pre-Evaluation) For a set of terms Λ (with |Λ| > 2), a pre-evaluation on Λ is a
sequence p that satisfies the following conditions:
(1) length of p is |p| = 2|Λ| − 1;
(2) for any 0 6 i 6 |Λ| − 1 we have (p)2i ∈ Λ;
(3) for any 1 6 i 6 |Λ| − 1 we have (p)2i−1 ∈ {≺,≈};
(4) for any term t ∈ Λ there exists a unique 0 6 j 6 |Λ| − 1 such that (p)2j = t. ♦
In other words, a pre-evaluation on Λ sorts (organizes) the terms in Λ, starting from the smallest and
ending in the largest.
Example 2.6 A pre-evaluation on {α0, α1, α2, α3, α4, α5, α6} is a sequence like
p = 〈α4,≺, α7,≈, α1,≈, α5,≺, α3,≺ α6,≈, α2〉. ♦
Definition 2.7 (Equality and Order in Pre-Evaluations) In a pre-evaluation p on Λ define the re-
lations ≈p and ≺p on Λ2 by the following conditions for s, t ∈ Λ:
(1) s ≈p t if there exists a sub-sequence q of p of length 2l − 1 (l > 1) such that
(a) either ((q)0 = s& (q)2l−2 = t) or ((q)0 = t& (q)2l−2 = s);
(b) for any 1 6 i 6 l − 1, (q)2i−1 = ≈.
(2) s ≺p t if there exists a sub-sequence q of p of length 2l − 1 (l > 1) such that
(a) (q)0 = s and (q)2l−2 = t;
(b) there exists some 1 6 i 6 l − 1 for which (q)2i−1 = ≺. ♦
Example 2.6 (Continued) We have α1 ≈p α5 ≈p α7 and α2 ≈p α6. Also, α4 ≺p α1, α4 ≺p α5, α4 ≺p α7,
α1 ≺p α2, α1 ≺p α3, and α1 ≺p α6 hold. ♦
Lemma 2.8 (Equivalence and Order by Pre-Evaluation) Let Λ be a set of terms, and p be a pre-
evaluation on Λ.
(1) The relation ≈p is an equivalence on Λ.
(2) The relation ≺p is a total order on Λ.
(3) The relations ≈p and ≺p are compatible with each other: if t ≈p s, and t ≺p u (respectively, u ≺p t),
then s ≺p u (respectively, u ≺p s).
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Proof. The parts (1) and (2) are immediate. For (3), suppose t ≈p s and t ≺p u. Then there is a
sub-sequence q of p which starts from t and ends with u and contains at least one special symbol ≺. There
must also be some other sub-sequence r which starts from either t or s and ends with the other one, and
all its special symbols are equality ≈. If r starts from s (and so ends with t), then the concatenation of
r and q results in a sub-sequence which starts from s and ends with u and contains some special symbol
≺. Whence s ≺p u. And if r starts from t, then q cannot be a sub-sequence of r because all the special
symbols in r are ≈ and q contains at least one special symbol ≺. Thus r has to be a sub-sequence of q.
Then there must exist a sub-sequence of p which starts from s and ends with u and contains a special
symbol ≺; whence s ≺p u. The other case (u ≺p t) can be proved very similarly. q
Definition 2.9 (Evaluation) A pre-evaluation p on a set of terms Λ is called an evaluation when, for
any term t, s ∈ Λ and any term u(x) with the free variable x, if t ≈p s and u(t/x), u(s/x) ∈ Λ hold, then
u(t/x) ≈p u(s/x) holds too. ♦
In other words, an evaluation on Λ is a pre-evaluation p on Λ whose equivalence relation ≈p is a congruence
relation on Λ.
Definition 2.10 (Satisfaction in an Evaluation) Let Λ be a set of terms and p an evaluation on it.
For terms t, s ∈ Λ we write p |= t = s when t ≈p s holds. We also write p |= t 6 s when either t ≈p s or
t ≺p s holds. So, for atomic formulas ϕ in the language of arithmetic LA we have defined the notion of
satisfaction p |= ϕ. The satisfaction relations can be extended to all open (quantifier-less) formulas as:
• p |= ϕ ∧ ψ ⇐⇒ p |= ϕ and p |= ψ
• p |= ϕ ∨ ψ ⇐⇒ p |= ϕ or p |= ψ
• p |= ϕ→ ψ ⇐⇒ if p |= ϕ then p |= ψ
• p |= ¬ϕ ⇐⇒ p 6|= ϕ ♦
Lemma 2.11 (Leibniz’s Law) Any evaluation p on any set of terms Λ satisfies all the available Skolem
instances of the axioms of equational logic, in particular Leibniz’s Law: for any t, s ∈ Λ and any open
formula ϕ(x), we have p |= t = s ∧ ϕ(t)→ ϕ(s).
Proof. Suppose p |= t = s. By induction on (the complexity) of (the open formula) ϕ one can show that
p |= ϕ(t) if and only if p |= ϕ(s). For atomic ϕ it follows from Lemma 2.8, and for the more complex
formulas it follows from the inductive definition of satisfaction in evaluations. q
Definition 2.12 (T−evaluation on Λ) For a set of terms Λ, an Skolem instance of a formula is called
to be available in Λ if all the terms appearing in it belong to Λ. For a theory T and a set of terms Λ and
an evaluation p on Λ, we say that p is an T−evaluation on Λ if p satisfies every Skolem instance of every
sentence in T which is available in Λ. ♦
So, T−evaluations, for a theory T , are kind of partial models of T . Indeed, if Λ is the set of all (ground)
terms (constructed from the language of T and the Skolem function symbols of the axioms of T ), then any
T−evaluaton on Γ (if exists) is a Herbrand Model of T . Herbrand’s Theorem can be read as “A theory T is
consistent if and only if for every finite set of (Skolem) terms, there exists an T−evaluation on it.” Thus,
the notion of Herbrand Consistency of a theory T is (equivalent to) the existence of an T−evaluation on
any (finite) set of terms.
uΣα∂
Σα`}ı ir http://saeedsalehi.ir/ c© Saeed Salehi 2011
M
A
N
U
S
C
R
IP
T
(S
u
b
m
it
t
e
d
)
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Example 2.13 Let T be axiomatized by the following sentences in LA:
• ∀x[x · 0 = 0];
• ∃y 6 0·0[y = 0·0]∧∀x[∃y 6 x·x[y = x·x]→ ∃y 6 S(x)·S(x)[y = S(x)·S(x)]]→ ∀x∃y 6 x·x[y = x·x].
Let Λ = {0, 0 · 0, c, c · c, q(c), S(c) · S(c), t, t · t, q(t)} where c and q are as in Example 2.4. As we saw in that
example, the following is an instance of the the second axiom (Ind), which is also available in Λ:
[0 6 0 · 0 ∨ 0 6= 0 · 0] ∨[
[q(c) 6 c · c ∧ q(c) = c · c] ∧ [S(c) · S(c) 6 S(c) · S(c) ∨ S(c) · S(c) 6= S(c) · S(c)]] ∨
[q(t) 6 t · t ∧ q(t) = t · t].
Suppose p is an T−evaluation on Λ. By the first axiom p must satisfy the instance 0 · 0 = 0, so we should
have p |= 0 · 0 = 0. Thus, p cannot satisfy the first disjunct of the above instance. Indeed, p cannot satisfy
the second disjunct either, because for any term u we have p |= u 6 u ∧ u = u. Thus, p cannot satisfy the
second conjunct of the second disjunct. Whence, p must satisfy the third disjunct of the above instance,
and in particular we should have p |= q(t) = t · t. ♦
Definition 2.14 (Skolem Hull) Let LSkA be the language expanding LA by the Skolem function (and
constant) symbols of all the existential formulas in the language LA. Or in other words, LSkA is the set
LSkA = {f∃xϕ(x) | ϕ is an LA − formula}. For a given set of terms Λ, let Λ〈j〉 be defined by induction on j:
Λ〈0〉 = Λ, and
Λ〈j+1〉 = Λ〈j〉 ∪ {f(t1, . . . , tm) | f ∈L ∧ t1, . . . , tm∈Λ〈j〉} ∪ {f∃xϕ(x)(t1, . . . , tm) | pϕq 6 j ∧ t1, . . . , tm∈Λ〈j〉},
where pϕq is the Go¨del code of ϕ. ♦
Bounding the Go¨del code of ϕ in the above definition will enable us to have some efficient (upper bound)
for the Go¨del code of Λ〈j〉 (see [11, 12]).
Herbrand’s theorem implies that for any ∃1−formula ∃xψ(x) (where ψ is an open formula) and any
theory T , if T ` ∃xψ(x) then there are some (Skolem) terms t1, . . . , tn such that T Sk ` ψ(t1)∨ . . .∨ψ(tn).
Usually this observation is called Herbrand’s Theorem. We will need a somehow dual of this fact.
Lemma 2.15 (Herbrand Proof of Universal Formulas) For a ∀1−formula ∀xψ(x) (where ψ is open)
and a theory T , suppose T ` ∀xψ(x). Let Λ be a set of terms and t ∈ Λ. There exists a finite (standard)
k > 0 such that for any T−evaluation p on Λ〈k〉 we have p |= ψ(t).
Proof. By T ` ∀xψ(x) the theory T Sk ∪ {¬ψ(c)}, where c is the Skolem constant symbol for ∃x¬ψ(x), is
inconsistent. Suppose ϕ is the rectified negation normal form of ¬ψ. Then, by Herbrand’s theorem, there
exists some finite set of terms Γ such that there can be no (T Sk∪{ϕ(c)})−evaluation on it. Since c appears
in Γ we write it as Γ(c), and by Γ(t) we denote the set of terms which result from the terms of Γ(c) by
replacing c with t everywhere. It can be clearly seen that there exists some k ∈ N such that Γ(t) ⊆ Λ〈k〉.
Whence, there cannot be any (T Sk ∪ {ϕ(t)})−evaluation on Λ〈k〉. Thus, any T−evaluation p on Λ〈k〉 must
satisfy p 6|= ϕ(t) or p |= ψ(t). q
Example 2.16 Let the theory T , in the language of arithmetic LA, be axiomatized by
(1)∀x[S(x) 6= 0] (2) ∀x, y[x+ S(y) = S(x+ y)]
(3)∀x∃z[x 6= 0→ x = S(z)] (4)∀x, y∃z[x 6 y → z + x = y]
For the open formula ψ(x) = (x 6 0→ x = 0) we have T ` ∀xψ(x).
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Let p(x) be the Skolem function for the formula ∃z[x = 0∨x = S(z)], and h(x, y) be the Skolem function
for the formula ∃z[x 6 y ∨ z + x = y]. Then the Skolemized form T Sk of the theory T will be as:
(1′) S(x) 6= 0 (2′)x+ S(y) = S(x+ y)
(3′)x = 0 ∨ x = S(p(x)) (4′)x 6 y ∨ h(x, y) + x = y
For a fixed term t let Γt be the following set of terms:
Γt = {0, t, h(t, 0), h(t, 0) + t, p(t), S(p(t)), h(t, 0) + p(t), h(t, 0) + S(p(t)), S
(
h(t, 0) + p(t)
)}.
Now we show that any T−evaluation p on Γt must satisfy p |= ψ(t) or, equivalently, if p |= t 6 0 then
p |= t = 0. Assume p |= t 6 0. Then by the fourth axiom we have p |= h(t, 0)+ t = 0. If p |= t = 0 does not
hold, then p |= t 6= 0, so by the third axiom we have p |= t = S(p(t)). Whence, p |= h(t, 0) + S(p(t)) = 0.
On the other hand, by the second axiom, p |= h(t, 0) + S(p(t)) = S(h(t, 0) + p(t)). So, we infer that
p |= S(h(t, 0) + p(t)) = 0, which is in contradiction with the first axiom. Thus, p |= t = 0 must hold, which
shows that p |= ψ(t). ♦
As was mentioned before, for a consistent theory T there must exist some Herbrand Model of T .
Definition 2.17 (Definable Herbrand Models) Let Λ be a set of terms, and define its Skolem Hull to
be Λ〈∞〉 =
⋃
n∈N Λ
〈n〉 (see Definition 2.14). For an evaluation p on Λ〈∞〉, let M(Λ, p) = {t/p | t ∈ Λ〈∞〉},
where t/p is the equivalence class of the relation ≈p containing t (cf. Lemma 2.8). Put the structure
(1) fM(Λ,p)(t1/p, . . . , tm/p) = f(t1, . . . , tm)/p,
(2) RM(Λ,p) = {(t1/p, . . . , tm/p) | p |= R t1, . . . , tm)},
on M(Λ, p), for any m−ary function symbol f and any m−ary relation symbol R. ♦
Lemma 2.18 (Herbrand Models by Evaluations) The structure on M(Λ, p) is well-defined, and for
a theory T , if p is an T−evaluation on Λ then M(Λ, p) |= T . q
3 Bounded Arithmetic and Herbrand Consistency
By an efficient Go¨del coding (see e.g. Chapter V of [5]) we can code sets, sequences (and so the syntactic
concepts like Skolem function symbols, Skolem instances, evaluations, etc.) such that the following ([5])
hold for any sequences α, β:
• pα ∗ βq 6 64 · (pαq · pβq), where ∗ denotes concatenation;
• |α| 6 log(pαq).
It follows that for any sets A,B we have pA∪Bq 6 64·(pAq·pBq) and |A| 6 log(pAq). We write X ∈ O(Y )
to indicate that X 6 Y · n+ n for some n ∈ N; that is X is linearly bounded by Y . The above (efficient)
coding has the property that for any sequence U = 〈u1, . . . , ul〉 we have log(pUq) ∈ O(
∑
i log(puiq)). For
any evaluation p on a set of terms Λ it can be seen that log(ppq) ∈ O(log(pΛq)).
Let us note that all of the concepts introduced so far can be formalized in the language of arithmetic
LA. Here we make the observation that, having an arithmetically definable set of terms Λ, the sets Λ〈j〉
are all definable in arithmetic (in terms of Λ and j), but the set Λ〈∞〉 is not definable by an arithmetical
formula. We will come to this point later. The arithmetical theory we are interested here is denoted by
I∆0 which is usually axiomatized by Robinson’s arithmetic, in the language LA, plus the induction axiom
for bounded formulas (see e.g. [5]).
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page 8 (of 14) Herbrand Consistency of Finite Fragments of I∆0
In this section we prove our main result: the existence of a finite fragment T ⊆ I∆0 whose Herbrand
Consistency is not provable in I∆0. As the exponential function x 7→ 2x is not available (provably total) in
I∆0, then we denote by log the set of elements x for which exp(x) = 2
x exists. Let us note that for a model
M, the set log(M) is the logarithm of the elements of M. The set log is closed under S and +, but not
under ×, in I∆0. We will use the term cut for any definable and downward closed set (not necessarily closed
under S) in the arithmetical models. The formula “y = exp(x)” is expressible in LA, and I∆0 can prove
some of the basic properties of exp (cf. [5]), though cannot prove its totality: I∆0 6` ∀x∃y[y = exp(x)]. By
log2 we denote the set of elements x for which exp2(x) = 22
x
exists; the superscripts on top of the functions
denote the iteration. Similarly, logn = {x | ∃y[y = expn(x)]}, where expn denotes the n time iteration of
the exponential function exp.
We use a deep theorem in bounded arithmetic, which happens to be the very last theorem of [5]. It
reads, in our terminology, as:
For any k > 0 there exists a bounded formula ϕ(x) such that
I∆0 + Ω1 ` ∀x ∈ logk+1ϕ(x), but I∆0 + Ω1 6` ∀x ∈ logkϕ(x).
It can be clearly seen that the theorem also holds for I∆0 instead of I∆0 + Ω1, and for any cut I (and
its logarithm log I = {x | ∃y ∈ I[y = exp(x)]}) instead of logk (and its logarithm logk+1); see also [3] and
(Theorem 3.6 of) [11].
Theorem 3.1 (Π1−Separation of Logarithmic Cuts) For any cut I there exists a bounded formula
ϕ(x) such that I∆0 ∪ {∃x∈I ϕ(x)} is consistent, but I∆0 ∪ {∃x∈ log I ϕ(x)} is not consistent. q
We will find the desired finite fragment of I∆0 (whose Herbrand Consistency is not provable in I∆0) in
three steps (the following subsections) before proving the main result (in the last subsection). For doing
so, we will show that for sufficiently strong finite fragments of I∆0, like T , if I∆0 ` HCon(T ) then the
consistency of the theory I∆0 ∪ {∃x∈ I θ(x)}, for some suitable cut I and a suitable bounded formula θ,
implies the consistency of the theory T ∪ {∃x∈ log I θ(x)}. As we will see, this contradicts Theorem 3.1.
3.1 The First Finite Fragment
Assuming the consistency of the theory I∆0 ∪ {∃x ∈ I ϕ(x),HCon(T )}, and inconsistency of the theory
T∪{∃x∈ log I ϕ(x)}, we can construct a modelM, from a given modelM |= I∆0∪{∃x∈I ϕ(x),HCon(T )},
such thatM |= T ∪{∃x∈ log I ϕ(x)}; which is in contradiction with the assumptions. For that, let us take
a (hypothetical) model M |= I∆0 ∪ {a∈ I ∧ ϕ(a)} ∪ {HCon(T )} for some a ∈ M. Then we form the set
Γ = {0, 1, 2, . . . ω1(a)} where i is a term in LA representing the number i, defined inductively as 0 = 0 and
i+ 1 = S(i). From the assumptionM |= HCon(T ) we find an T−evaluation p on Λ〈j〉, for a suitable j and
a suitable Λ which contains the above set Γ. Then we can form the modelM(Λ, p) and, by some technical
details, show that M(Λ, p) |= T + ∃x ∈ log Iϕ(x). The bound ω1(a) assures us that the set Γ contains
the range of (the bounded) quantifiers in the (bounded) formula ϕ(a). For the Go¨del code of i we have
log(piq) ∈ O(log(2i)) and so log(pΓq) ∈ O(log(2(ω1(a))2)) whence log(pΓq) ∈ O( log ( exp2(2(log a)2))). We
need the closure of Γ under the Skolem function symbols of (a finite fragment of) I∆0, that is Γ
〈∞〉 (see
Definitions 2.17 and 2.14). Since, unfortunately, that set is not definable, we consider the set Γ〈j〉 for a
non-standard j, which makes sense if pΓq (and so a) is non-standard. In case a is standard, then the proof
becomes trivial (see below). For some non-standard j with j 6 log4(pΓq) we can form the set Γ〈j〉, in case
ω2(pΓq) exists (see [11, 12]). And finally we have log
(
ω2(pΓq)
) ∈ O( log ( exp2(4(log a)4))).
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Herbrand Consistency of Finite Fragments of I∆0 page 9 (of 14)
Definition 3.2 (The Cut I) The cut I is defined to be {x | ∃y[y = exp2(4(log a)4)]}, and its logarithm
is log I = {x | ∃y[y = exp2(4a4)]}. ♦
Applying theorem 3.1 to the cut I defined above, we find a (fixed) bounded formula θ and a finite fragment
T0 ⊆ I∆0 such that the theory the theory I∆0 ∪ {∃x∈ Iθ(x)} is consistent, but T0 ∪ {∃x∈ log Iθ(x)} is
not consistent.
Definition 3.3 (The First Fragment T0) Let T0 be a finite fragment of I∆0 for which there exists a
(fixed) bounded formula θ such that the theory I∆0 ∪ {∃x∈Iθ(x)} is consistent, but T0 ∪ {∃x∈ log Iθ(x)}
is not consistent. Let M be a (fixed) model such that M |= I∆0 ∪ {∃x∈Iθ(x)}. ♦
In the rest of the paper we will show that for a finite fragment T of I∆0 extending T0 we have that
M 6|= HCon(T ), where HCon is the predicate of Herbrand Consistency.
3.2 The Second Finite Fragment
The proof of the main result goes roughly as follows: if M |= HCon(T ), for a finite fragment T ⊆ I∆0
to be specified later, then there exists (in M) some T−evaluation p on some Λ〈j〉, where Λ ⊇ Γ is
to be specified later and Γ and j are as in the previous subsection. Whence we can form the model
M(Λ, p), for which we already have M(Λ, p) |= T . Our second finite fragment T1 will have the property
that if T ⊇ T1 then M(Λ, p) |= θ0(a/p). The third finite fragment T2 will have the property that if
T ⊇ T2 then we have M(Λ, p) |= a/p ∈ log I. So, finally we will get the model M(Λ, p) which satisfies
M(Λ, p) |= T + [a/p∈ log I ∧ θ0(a/p)], or, in the other words, M(Λ, p) |= T ∪ {∃x∈ log Iθ0(x)} which is in
contradiction with (the choice of the first finite fragment) T0 ⊆ T .
Definition 3.4 (The Second Fragment T1) Let T1 be a finite fragment of I∆0 which can prove the
following (I∆0−provable ∀∗−)sentences:
• x+ 0 = x • x+ S(y) = S(x+ y)
• x · 0 = 0 • x · S(y) = x · y + x
• x 6 0↔ x = 0 • x 6 S(y)↔ x = S(y) ∨ x 6 y
• x 6 y ∨ y 6 x • x 6 y 6 z → x 6 z
• x 6 z + x • x 6 x+ z
• x+ z 6 y + z → x 6 y • z 6= 0 ∧ x · z 6 y · z → x 6 y
• x 6= y ↔ S(x) 6 y ∨ S(y) 6 x • x 6 y ↔ S(y) 6 x
and also can prove the following (I∆0−provable ∀∗∃∗−)sentences:
• x 6 y → ∃z[z + x = y]
• y 6= 0→ ∃q, r[x = r + q · y ∧ r 6 y] ♦
Remark 3.5 It can be seen that T1 can prove the following arithmetical sentences:
• S(x) 6= 0 • S(x) = S(y)→ x = y
• S(x) 6 x • x 6= 0→ ∃y[x = S(y)]
For a proof, first note that by x 6 y ∨ y 6 x we have ∀u[u 6 u], and also from x 6 z + x and x + 0 = x
we get ∀u[0 6 u]. Now, if S(u) = 0, then S(u) 6 0, and so by the axiom x 6 y ↔ S(y) 6 x we get
0 6 u, contradiction! Also from the same axiom it follows that u 6 u ↔ S(u) 6 u, and thus S(u) 6 u.
If S(u) = S(v) and u 6= v then by x 6= y ↔ S(x) 6 y ∨ S(y) 6 x we have either S(u) 6 v or S(v) 6 u.
If S(u) 6 v then S(v) 6 v, contradiction! The other case is similar. Finally, assume u 6= 0. Then by
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page 10 (of 14) Herbrand Consistency of Finite Fragments of I∆0
x 6 0 ↔ x = 0 we have u 6 0 and so the axiom x 6 y ↔ S(y) 6 x implies that S(0) 6 u. Thus, by
x 6 y → ∃z[z + x = y] we have v + S(0) = u for some v. Then from x + S(y) = S(x + y) and x + 0 = x
we conclude that S(v) = u. Q.E.D ♦
The main property of T1 is the following:
Theorem 3.6 (The Main Property of T1) Suppose M |= I∆0 + [a ∈ I ∧ θ(a)] + HCon(T ) is a non-
standard model where θ is a bounded formula and a ∈ M is non-standard and T ` T1. If p ∈M is an
T−evaluation on Λ〈j〉 where Λ is a set of terms such that Λ ⊇ Γ = {i | i 6 ω1(a)} and j is a non-
standard element of M, then for any bounded formula ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) and any elements i1, . . . , in 6 a,
M |= ϕ(i1, . . . , in) ⇐⇒ M(Λ, p) |= ϕ(i1/p, . . . , in/p).
We prove the theorem by induction on (the complexity) of ϕ (see also [11, 12]).
Lemma 3.7 (Another Property of T1) Suppose K |= T1 and a∈K, and let t be a term in LA. For any
i1, . . . , in 6 a in K and any b∈K, if K |= b 6 t(i1, . . . , in) then there exists a term s and there are some
j1, . . . , jm 6 a such that K |= b = s(j1, . . . , jm).
Proof. By induction on t:
• t = 0: if K |= b 6 0 then by the T1−axiom x 6 0↔ x = 0 we have K |= b = 0.
• t = S(t1): if K |= b 6 S(t1) then by x 6 S(y) ↔ x = S(y) ∨ x 6 y which is a T1−axiom, we have
K |= b = S(t1) ∨ b 6 t1, and the result follows from the induction hypothesis.
• t = t1 + t2: if K |= b 6 t1 + t2 then by the T1−axiom x 6 y∨ y 6 x we have that K |= b 6 t2 ∨ t2 6 b.
If K |= b 6 t2 then the conclusion follows from the induction hypothesis. Otherwise if K |= t2 6 b then
by x 6 y → ∃z[z + x = y] (another T1−axiom) there exists some d ∈ K such that K |= d + t2 = b. Thus
K |= d + t2 6 t1 + t2, whence by the T1−axiom x + z 6 y + z → x 6 y we have K |= d 6 t1, and the
desired result follows from the induction hypothesis and the fact that K |= b = d+ t2.
• t = t1 · t2: assume K |= b 6 t1 · t2. If K |= t2 = 0 then K |= t1 · t2 = 0 by the T1−axiom x · 0 = 0.
And so K |= b 6 0 is reduced to the first case above. Now suppose K |= t2 6= 0. Then by the T1−axiom
y 6= 0→ ∃q, r[x = r+ q · y ∧ r 6 y] we have K |= b = r+ q · t2 ∧ r 6 t2 for some q, r∈K. By the T1−axiom
x 6 z + x we have K |= q · t2 6 r + q · t2 = b 6 t1 · t2 and so from the T1−axiom x 6 y 6 z → x 6 z
it follows that K |= q · t2 6 t1 · t2, and the T1−axiom z 6= 0 ∧ x · z 6 y · z → x 6 y implies that
K |= q 6 t1 (since K |= t2 6= 0). Now, the desired conclusion follows from the induction hypothesis and
K |= b = r + q · t2 ∧ r 6 t2 ∧ q 6 t1. q
Lemma 3.8 (Preservation of Atomic Formulas) With the assumptions of Theorem 3.6 for any atomic
formula ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) and any i1, . . . , in 6 a, we have that
M |= ϕ(i1, . . . , in) ⇐⇒ M(Λ, p) |= ϕ(i1/p, . . . , in/p).
Proof. By the T1−axioms x 6= y ↔ S(x) 6 y∨S(y) 6 x and x 6 y ↔ S(y) 6 x it suffices to prove the one
direction only: M |= ϕ(i1, . . . , in) =⇒M(Λ, p) |= ϕ(i1/p, . . . , in/p). If ϕ = “t 6 s” for some LA−terms t
and s, then M |= t 6 s implies the existence of some b∈M such that M |= b+ t = s. By the T1−axiom
x 6 x + z, M |= b 6 s so by Lemma 3.7 there exists an LA−term r (and some j1, . . . , jm 6 a) such that
K |= b = r. Whence,M |= r+ t = s. So, noting thatM,M(Λ, p) |= T1, it suffices to prove the lemma for
the atomic formula ϕ of the form ϕ = “t = s”.
For that we first note that if i1, . . . , in 6 a then t(i1, . . . , in), s(i1, . . . , in) 6 ω1(a) holds. Suppose we
have M |= t(i1, . . . , in) = s(i1, . . . , in) = i. We show by induction on (the complexity of) t that the
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Herbrand Consistency of Finite Fragments of I∆0 page 11 (of 14)
conditionM |= t(i1, . . . , in) = i impliesM(Λ, p) |= t(i1/p, . . . , in/p) = i/p. Let us note that the statement
M(Λ, p) |= t(i1/p, . . . , in/p) = i/p is equivalent to M |= “p |= t(i1, . . . , in) = i”. So, it suffices to show the
equivalence M |= t(i1, . . . , in) = i ↔ “p |= t(i1, . . . , in) = i” by induction on t. For t = 0 and t = S(t1)
the result follows from the definition 0 = 0 and j + 1 = S(j). And for t = t1 + t2 and t = t1 · t2 the result
follows from the T1−axioms x+ 0 = x, x+ S(y) = S(x+ y), x · 0 = 0, and x · S(y) = x · y + x. q
Hence, the lemma also holds for open formulas ϕ as well. For bounded formulas we note that the range
of quantifiers of ϕ(i1, . . . , in) for i1, . . . , in 6 a is contained in the set {j | j 6 ω1(a)}. This is formally
expressed in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.9 (End-Extension Property) With the assumptions of Theorem 3.6, if for some i 6 a and
some term t we have (M |=)p |= t 6 i then there exists some j 6 i such that (M |=)p |= t = j.
Proof. By induction on the term i. For i = 0, if p |= t 6 0 then by Lemma 2.15, and the T1−axiom
x 6 0 ↔ x = 0, we have p |= t = 0 = 0. For i = S(j), if p |= t 6 S(j) then by Lemma 2.15, and the
T1−axiom x 6 S(y) ↔ x = S(y) ∨ x 6 y, we must have that p |= t = S(j) ∨ t 6 j. Now the conclusion
follows from the induction hypothesis. q
Now we can prove Theorem 3.6.
Proof. (of Theorem 3.6) By induction on (the complexity of the bounded formula) ϕ. As the lemma
has been proved for open formulas ϕ, it suffices to show that if the lemma holds for the (bounded) formula
ϕ then it also holds for the (bounded) formula ∃x 6 t(i1, . . . , in)ϕ(x, i1, . . . , in) where t is an LA−term; in
the other words:
M |= ∃x 6 t(i1, . . . , in)ϕ(x, i1, . . . , in) ⇐⇒ M(Λ, p) |= ∃x 6 t(i1/p, . . . , in/p)ϕ(i1/p, . . . , in/p).
• If M |= b 6 t(i1, . . . , in) ∧ ϕ(b, i1, . . . , in), for some b ∈ M, then by Lemma 3.7 there are terms s and
elements j1, . . . , jm 6 a such that M |= b = s(j1, . . . , jm). So, we have M |= ϕ(s(j1, . . . , jm), i1, . . . , in).
Whence, by the induction hypothesis we also have M(Λ, p) |= ϕ(s(j1/p, . . . , jm/p), i1/p, . . . , in/p), thus,
noting that we already haveM(Λ, p) |= s(j1/p, . . . , jm/p) 6 t(i1/p, . . . , in/p), the desired conclusion holds:
M(Λ, p) |= ∃x 6 t(i1/p, . . . , in/p)ϕ(i1/p, . . . , in/p).
• Conversely, if M(Λ, p) |= d 6 t(i1/p, . . . , in/p) ∧ ϕ(d, i1/p, . . . , in/p) holds for some d ∈M(Λ, p) then by
Lemma 3.7 there are some LA−term s and some l1, . . . , lm 6 a/p such that M(Λ, p) |= d = s(l1, . . . , lm).
For each α 6 m there is some term `α ∈ Λ〈∞〉 such that lα = `α/p. For each such α we also have that
M(Λ, p) |= `α/p 6 a/p or equivalently M |= “p |= `α 6 a”. So, by Lemma 3.9 there exists some jα 6 a
for which we have M |= `α = jα. Whence, M(Λ, p) |= d = s(j1/p, . . . , jm/p) and so
M(Λ, p) |= s(j1/p, . . . , jm/p) 6 t(i1/p, . . . , in/p), and
M(Λ, p) |= ϕ(s(j1/p, . . . , jm/p), i1/p, . . . , in/p).
Thus, by the induction hypothesis we have
M |= s(j1, . . . , jm) 6 t(i1, . . . , in), and M |= ϕ(s(j1, . . . , jm), i1, . . . , in).
So, we conclude that M |= ∃x 6 t(i1, . . . , in)ϕ(x, i1, . . . , in). q
Let us repeat where we are now: in looking for a finite fragment T ⊆ I∆0 such that I∆0 6` HCon(T )
we found a finite fragment T0 ⊆ I∆0 and a bounded formula θ(x) such that T0 ` ¬∃x∈ log Iθ(x) but the
theory I∆0 + ∃x∈Iθ(x) is consistent and has a modelM |= I∆0 + [a∈I ∧ θ(a)]. Then we aim at showing
that M 6|= HCon(T ). If M |= HCon(T ) then we form the set of formulas Γ = {i | i 6 ω1(a)} for which
ω2(pΓq) exists (by the very definition of I and the assumption a ∈ I), and so we can form the model
M(Γ, p) where p is an T−evaluaiton on Γ〈j〉 (where j 6 log4(pΓq) can be taken to be non-standard if a is
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so). The theory T1 had the property thatM(Γ, p) |= θ(a/p) (by Theorem 3.6), and in the next subsection
we introduce a finite fragment T2 ⊆ I∆0 such that for a suitable Λ ⊇ Γ (to be defined later) we will have
M(Λ, p) |= a/p∈ log I. Then by taking T to be any finite fragment of I∆0 which extends T0 ∪ T1 ∪ T2 we
will conclude that M |= ¬HCon(T ).
3.3 The Third Finite Fragment
The fragments T0 and T1 were chosen not by their axioms but by their implications; T0 had to prove
¬∃x ∈ log Iθ(x) (Definition 3.3), and T1 had to prove some certain arithmetical statements (Definition 3.4).
But for T2 we require that it contains one of the following sentences as (one of) its (explicit) axioms (not
only its consequences).
Definition 3.10 (Axioms for Totality of Squaring Function) (1) The induction principle for the
bounded formula ψ(x) = “∃y 6 x2[y = x ·x]” is denoted by Ind : ψ(0)∧∀x
(
ψ(x)→ ψ(S(x)))→ ∀xψ(x).
Or, in other words (cf. Examples 2.4,2.13) Ind, which is an axiom of the theory I∆0, is the sentence:
∃y 6 02[y = 0 · 0] ∧ ∀x(∃y 6 x2[y = x · x]→ ∃y 6 S(x)2[y = S(x) · S(x)]) =⇒ ∀x∃y 6 x2[y = x · x].
(2) The Π1−sentence expressing the totality of squaring is denoted by Ω0 : ∀x∃y 6 x2[y = x · x]. ♦
We denote by q(x) the Skolem function symbol of the formula ∃y 6 x2[y = x · x] (cf. Examples 2.4,2.13).
Then the Skolemized forms of the axioms of Definition 3.10 will be as
1. [u 6 02 ∨ u 6= 0 · 0] ∨[
[q(c) 6 c2 ∧ q(c) = c · c] ∧ [v 6 S(c)2 ∨ v 6= S(c) · S(c)]] ∨
[q(x) 6 x2 ∧ q(x) = x · x],
where u, v, x are free variables and c is the Skolem constant as in Example 2.4.
2. q(x) 6 x2 ∧ q(x) = x · x.
Define the terms qi’s by induction: q0 = S(S(0)) and qi+1 = q(qi). It can be easily seen that qi represents
the number exp2(i), while for the code of qi we have log(pqiq) ∈ O
(
log(exp(i))
)
. That is to say that
while the value of the term qi is of double exponential, the code of it is of (single) exponential. This (one)
exponential gap, will make our proof to go through.
Formulating the statement “x ∈ log2” can be stated as “there exists a sequence s such that (s)0 = 2 and
|s| = x+1 and for any i < x we have (s)i+1 = (s)i ·(s)i”. And “y ∈ log I” can be stated as “4y4 ∈ log2”. Put
Υ = {qi | i 6 4a4}. Then any Ω0−evaluaton or Ind−evaluation on Υ〈∞〉 must satisfy qi+1 = qi ·qi for any
i < 4a4. If p is any such evaluation, thenM(Υ, p) |= ∀i < 4(a/p)4[qi+1/p = qi/p·qi/p]. We require the finite
fragment T2 ⊆ I∆0 to have the property that for any model K |= T2 if there are elements q0, q1, . . . , qb ∈ K
such that K satisfies q0 = 2 and qi+1 = q2i for any i < b, then K |= b ∈ log2. Let us note that the code of the
sequence 〈exp2(0), exp2(1), . . . , exp2(b)〉 is roughly bounded by ∏i6b exp2(i) ≈ (exp2(b))2 = exp2(b + 1).
So, in the presence of q0, q1, . . . , qb ∈ K with the above property, the (code of the) sequence s with the
property “(s)0 = 2, |s| = x + 1 and for any i < x, (s)i+1 = (s)i · (s)i” must exist. Note also that
I∆0 ` ∀i[i ∈ log2 → i+ 1 ∈ log2]. (>)
Definition 3.11 (The Third Fragment T2) (1) If the usual axiomatization of I∆0 is taken into ac-
count, then let T2 be a finite fragment of it which contains the axiom Ind and has the property (>)
above.
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(2) If I∆0 has been axiomatized all by Π1−formulas, where the induction axioms are in the form
∀y(ϕ(0) ∧ ∀x < y[ϕ(x)→ ϕ(S(x))]→ ∀x 6 yϕ(x))
for bounded ϕ, then we take the theory T2 to be a finite fragment of I∆
Π
0 + Ω0, where I∆
Π
0 is the above
Π1−axiomaitzation of I∆0, together with the axiom Ω0, such that it has the property (>) above. So, in
this case T2 is a Π1−theory. ♦
Let us reiterate the main property of T2 again.
The Main Property of T2 For a model K |= T2 if there are q0, q1, . . . , qb ∈ K such that for any j < b
we have K |= qj+1 = q2j then K |= “b ∈ log2”. ♦
3.4 The Proof of the Main Result
Let T be any finite fragment of I∆0 or I∆
Π
0 + Ω0 such that T ⊇ T0 ∪ T1 ∪ T2. If T2 is taken as in the
clause (1) of Definition 3.11 then T is truly a finite fragment of I∆0, and if T2 is taken as in the clause
(2) of Definition 3.11 then T is a finite I∆0−derivable Π1−theory, whose conjunction (denoted by U) is a
I∆0−derivable Π1−sentence.
Theorem 3.12 (The Main Theorem) (1) For a finite fragment T of I∆0 we have I∆0 6` HCon(T ).
(2) There exists an I∆0−derivable Π1−sentence U such that I∆0 6` HCon(U).
Proof. For the part (1) take T2 as in clause (1) of Definition 3.11, and for part (2) take T2 as in clause (2)
of Definition 3.11, and let U be the conjunction of the axioms of T . In each case we will have the Skolem
function symbol q(x) for squaring x 7→ x2.
By Theorem 3.1 there exists a (fixed) bounded formula θ(x), for the cut I defined in Definition 3.2,
such that I∆0 6` ¬∃x ∈Iθ(x) and T0 ` ¬∃x∈ log Iθ(x) (see Definition 3.3). Fix M |= I∆0 + [a∈I ∧ θ(a)].
We show that M 6|= HCon(T ).
Assume, for the sake of contradiction, thatM |= HCon(T ). Define the terms i’s and qi’s by induction:
0 = 0, i+ 1 = S(i), q0 = 2, qi+1 = q(qi). Let Λ be the set of terms {i | i 6 ωa(a)} ∪ {qi | i 6 ω1(a)} in
M. As we saw earlier, the code of i (and qi) are bounded by some polynomial of exp(i) and the code of
the Λ is polynomially bounded by exp
(
(ω1(a)
2)
)
or exp2
(
2(log a)2
)
, and finally ω2(pΛq) is polynomially
bounded by exp2
(
4(log a)4
)
; which exists by the assumption a ∈ I. We note that a is non-standard,
because otherwise we would have a ∈ log I and whence M would be a model of the inconsistent theory
I∆0 + ∃x∈ log Iθ(x); a contradiction with the hypothesis. The existence of ω2(pΛq) assures the existence
of a non-standard element j(6 log4(pΛq)) for which Λ〈j〉 exists, and so by the assumptionM |= HCon(T )
there must exist some T−evaluation p on Λ〈j〉 (hence, on Λ〈∞〉) in M. So, we can form the model
M(Λ, p). For this model we have M(Λ, p) |= T by Lemma 2.18. Since M |= θ(a) (and M(Λ, p) |= T1)
then M(Λ, p) |= θ(a/p) by Theorem 3.6. Also, since M(Λ, p) |= T2 and q0, q1, . . . , qb (for b = 4a4) are
elements of M(Λ, p) such that M(Λ, p) |= q0 = 2 and M(Λ, p) |= qi+1 = q2i for any i < b, then (by
the main property of T2) M(Λ, p) |= “b ∈ log2”. Or, in other words, M(Λ, p) |= “a/p∈ log I”. Whence,
M(Λ, p) |= [a/p∈ log I∧θ(a/p)]. So,M(Λ, p) is a model of T+∃x∈ log Iθ(x), and this is contradiction with
the assumption of T ⊇ T0 and the inconsistency of the theory T0 + ∃x∈ log Iθ(x). Thus M 6|= HCon(T )
and so I∆0 6` HCon(T ). q
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